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The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom Equality 
Jennifer Levi† & Daniel Redman‡ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is a basic fact of biology that every person requires access to the 
bathroom.  Today, for transgender people,1 this right of access is often 
held hostage by thoughtless and uninformed authorities.  As a result of 
bathroom discrimination, transgender people frequently suffer health 
problems and face violence or harassment.  Bathroom inequality is one 
of the greatest barriers to full integration of transgender people in Ameri-
can life.  And, even more, opponents of transgender-inclusive nondiscri-
mination laws have systematically embraced a strategy of leveraging the 
discomfort and fears people have around bathroom safety and privacy to 
foment opposition to transgender equality. 
This Article offers a new set of arguments for transgender equality 
based on a little-known series of cases in which courts declined to en-
force cross-dressing laws against transgender defendants.  As shown be-
low, the arguments brought by the defenders of these laws closely mirror 
the arguments brought today in favor of bathroom discrimination.  In this 
Article, we put both the bathroom and cross-dressing debates in histori-
cal context, draw out the underlying reasoning in the two sets of cases, 
and argue that the reasoning that supports bathroom discrimination is as 
flawed as the reasoning behind criminal cross-dressing laws.  The analy-
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 1. We use the term transgender throughout the Article as an umbrella term that is used to de-
scribe a wide range of identities and experiences, including but not limited to:  pre-operative, post-
operative, and non-operative transsexual people; male and female cross-dressers (sometimes referred 
to as “transvestites,” “drag queens,” or “drag kings”); intersexed individuals; and men and women, 
regardless of sexual orientation, whose appearance or characteristics are perceived to be gender 
atypical.  PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS AND 
THE POLICY INSTITUTE OF THE NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, TRANSGENDER 
EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 3 (JUNE 19, 2000), available at 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/TransgenderEquality.pdf. 
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sis also suggests that, just as the arguments for cross-dressing prohibi-
tions have not withstood advances in public understanding of transgender 
people and their lives, neither will the arguments for bathroom discrimi-
nation. 
In Part I, we discuss the current state of the law, present personal 
testimonials of transgender people denied bathroom access, place the 
bathroom debate in historical context, and show how that debate evolved 
to the present day.  In Part II, we analyze the body of case law dealing 
with bathroom access and discrimination, outlining the types of argu-
ments brought by anti-transgender advocates to justify withholding bath-
room access: preventing fraud and crime, discouraging overt homosex-
uality, and enforcing gender norms.  In Part III, we analyze the body of 
case law dealing with the cross-dressing laws, demonstrate that defen-
dants used the same arguments being used today in the bathroom context, 
and show how the courts rejected these arguments.  In Part IV, we com-
pare the two bodies of case law and offer new arguments for bathroom-
access equality. 
II.  BATHROOM EQUALITY: HISTORY OF THE DEBATE 
A.  Contemporary Situation 
The past two decades have brought many advances in equal rights 
for transgender individuals.  Beginning in the early 1990s, the queer 
movement began to advocate inclusive nondiscrimination protections 
that would include gender identity and expression as protected characte-
ristics.  In 1993, Minnesota became the first state to add language to its 
state nondiscrimination law to ensure that transgender people would be 
protected.2  The second state to do so was Rhode Island in 2001.3  Today, 
thirteen states and the District of Columbia prohibit discrimination based 
on gender identity,4 and a number of other states continue to pursue 
                                                        
 2. Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363A.03 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 
(2009) (employment); MINN. STAT. § 363A.09 (2009) (housing/property); MINN. STAT. § 363A.13 
(2009) (education); MINN. STAT. § 363A.16 (2009) (credit). 
 3. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-3 (2009). 
 4. California, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12920 (2010); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-402, -
502 (2009); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE §§ 2-1402.11, .21, .41 (2010); Hawaii, HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 515-3 (2009); Illinois, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-103 (2009); Iowa, IOWA CODE §§ 216.6, 
.8–10 (2009); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4571, 4581, 4595, 4601 (2010); Minnesota, 
MINN. STAT. § 363A.02 (2009); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-9.1, -12.5, -12, -4 (West 
2010; New Mexico, N.M.  STAT. § 28-1-7 (2009); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030 (2009); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS, §§ 28-5-6, 34-37-3, 11-24-2.1 (2009); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495, 4503, 
10403 (2009); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (2009).  There are, of course, variations 
among these laws including whether, for example, the laws add “gender identity,” “gender identity 
and expression,” or some variation of that language to the law as well as whether the law adds a new 
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comparable laws.5  In addition, cities across the country have added 
gender identity and expression to municipal nondiscrimination ordin-
ances.6 
That said, transgender people—much like gay, lesbian, and bisex-
ual people—still lack nondiscrimination protections under both federal 
and most states’ laws in employment, housing, and public accommoda-
tions.  This lack of protection is particularly apparent in the issue of bath-
room access.  Federal regulations require that all employers provide 
                                                                                                                            
category of protected characteristics or modifies existing ones such as “sexual orientation;” see, e.g., 
MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(44) (2009) (defining “Sexual orientation” as “having or being perceived as 
having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or female-
ness”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(9-C) (2009) (defining “Sexual orientation” as “a person’s 
actual or perceived heterosexuality, bisexuality, homosexuality or gender identity or expression”); 
see also, CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 1, at 41–44.  Regardless of the approach, the goal of such 
laws is to ensure that anyone who is gender non-conforming in some way (or transgender) is pro-
tected by the laws’ reach. 
 5. See, e.g., An Act Relative to Gender-Based Discrimination and Hate Crimes, H.B. 1722, 
185th Sess. (Mass. 2007); An Act Concerning Discrimination, H.B. 5723, 2008 Sess. (Conn. 2008).  
Much has already been written about why adding gender identity and expression to state laws is 
important to ensure that transgender people are protected against discrimination.  While existing sex 
discrimination laws should and could protect many transgender people, see, e.g., Smith v. Salem, 
Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Rosa v. 
Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 
293 (D.D.C. 2008), historically many courts have read into sex discrimination laws an exclusion 
from the laws’ protection.  See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers 
v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprin-
cipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender 
People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37 (Fall 2000).  As a result, adding clear and explicit pro-
tections for transgender people has become an important part of transgender advocacy. 
 6. See U.S. Jurisdictions with Laws Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity 
or Expression, TRANSGENDER LAW & POLICY INST. (2010), 
http://transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/index.htm#jurisdictions ((in reverse chronological order) Nash-
ville, TN; Kalamazoo, MI; Broward, FL; Columbia, SC; Detroit, MI; Gainesville, FL; Hamtramck, 
MI; Kansas City, MO; Oxford, OH; Lake Worth, FL; Milwaukee, WI; Palm Beach County, FL; 
Saugatuck, MI; West Palm Beach, FL; Bloomington, IN; Cincinnati, OH; Easton, PA; Ferndale, MI; 
Hillsboro, OR; Johnson County, IA; King County, WA; Lansdowne, PA; Lansing, MI; Swarthmore, 
PA; West Chester, PA; Gulfport, FL; Indianapolis, IN; Lincoln City, OR; Northampton, MA; Alba-
ny, NY; Austin, TX; Beaverton, OR; Bend, OR; Burien, WA; Oakland, CA; Miami Beach, FL; 
Tompkins County, NY; Carbondale, IL; Covington, KY; El Paso, TX; Ithaca, NY; Key West, FL; 
Lake Oswego, OR; Monroe Co., FL; Peoria, IL; San Diego, CA; Scranton, PA; Springfield, IL; 
University City, MO; Allentown, PA; Baltimore, MD; Boston, MA; Buffalo, NY; Chicago, IL; Cook 
County, IL; Dallas, TX; Decatur, IL; East Lansing, MI; Erie County, PA; New Hope, PA; New York 
City, NY; Philadelphia, PA; Salem, OR; Tacoma, WA; Denver, CO; Huntington Woods, MI; Mult-
nomah Co., OR; Rochester, NY; Suffolk County, NY; Atlanta, GA; Boulder, CO; DeKalb, IL; Mad-
ison, WI; Portland, OR; Ann Arbor, MI; Jefferson County, KY; Lexington-Fayette Co., KY; Louis-
ville, KY; Tucson, AZ; Benton County, OR; Santa Cruz County, CA; New Orleans, LA; Toledo, 
OH; West Hollywood, CA; York, PA; Cambridge, MA; Evanston, IL; Olympia, WA; Pittsburgh, 
PA; Ypsilanti, MI; Iowa City, IA; Grand Rapids, MI; San Francisco, CA; Santa Cruz, CA; St. Paul, 
MN; Seattle, WA; Harrisburg, PA; Los Angeles, CA; Urbana, IL; Champaign, IL; Minneapolis, 
MN). 
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access to restrooms,7 yet the dearth of federal gender-nondiscrimination 
protection permits employers to discriminate as to who can use which 
bathroom.  In states without transgender-inclusive nondiscrimination 
laws, it is not uncommon for a transgender person to be forced to use a 
bathroom that is inconsistent with his or her gender identity—an expe-
rience this Article refers to as bathroom discrimination.8  This treatment 
constitutes discrimination because it ignores the real and central element 
of a transgender person’s identity—his or her gender identity—while 
respecting the gender identity of persons who are not transgender. 
Even in states and cities with transgender-inclusive nondiscrimina-
tion laws, transgender people face significant barriers to equal bathroom 
access.  In a 2002 survey conducted by the San Francisco Human Rights 
Commission, nearly 50% of transgender respondents reported harass-
ment or assault in a public bathroom, notwithstanding California’s trans-
gender-inclusive legal protections.  Because of this, the report concluded, 
“[M]any transgender people avoid public bathrooms altogether and can 
develop health problems as a result.”9  One respondent wrote: 
I have spent so many hours avoiding public multi-stall bathrooms 
that I have damaged my bladder and put pressure on my kidneys.  
The problem was a daily one.  I’d think about where I was going, 
                                                        
 7. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.141(d)(2)(i) (2010) (“Lavatories shall be made available in all places of 
employment.”).  The history of bathroom sex segregation is summarily explained in C.J. Griffin, 
Workplace Restroom Policies in Light of New Jersey’s Gender Identity Protection, 61 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 409, 414–15 (2009); see also Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals in Public Restrooms: Law, Cultur-
al Geography and Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 673, 685 
(2009). 
 8. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007) (upholding a 
ruling by the District of Utah that it was legally permissible to fire a transgender woman because 
“use of women’s public restrooms by a biological male could result in liability”); Johnson v. Fresh 
Mark, Inc., 98 F. App’x 461, 461 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding district court ruling that plaintiff had 
failed to state a claim for sex discrimination against employer who fired transgender female em-
ployee for refusing to use the men’s restroom); Sommers, 667 F.2d at 748, 749 (upholding district 
court ruling that denial of bathroom access to a transgender employee followed by termination is 
“not within the ambit” of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 
850 F. Supp 284, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss civil rights suit 
brought by transgender plaintiff who suffered discrimination through, among other things, denial of 
appropriate bathroom access); Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 54 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2005) (holding that a landlord could refuse to renew a non-profit’s lease because the non-
profit’s transgender clients used the restrooms in the building).  Although New York does not in-
clude gender identity or expression in its civil rights law, courts have held for transgender plaintiffs 
in other contexts based on disability or sex discrimination claims.  See, e.g., Doe v. Bell, 754 
N.Y.S.2d 846, 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003). 
 9. TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER, PEEING IN PEACE, A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR TRANSGENDER 
ACTIVISTS AND ALLIES, 3 (2005), available at http://transgenderlawcenter.org/pdf/PIP%20Resource
%20Guide.pdf. 
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what bathrooms I’d have access to, how much I drank during the 
day, whether I’d be with people who could help stand guard . . . .10 
Transgender people are forced out of employment and school be-
cause they are denied access to bathrooms.  In Goins v. West, a trans-
gender plaintiff in a civil rights lawsuit argued that she faced construc-
tive termination because her employer refused to allow her to use the 
women’s restroom.11  Among other types of discrimination that trans-
gender youth face, bathroom-based discrimination is one of the top 
forces pushing them to drop out of school.12 
Bathroom discrimination is real and terrifying.  Leslie Feinberg, a 
transgender activist and author, writes: 
We live under the constant threat of horrifying violence.  We have 
to worry about what bathroom to use when our bladders are aching.  
We are forced to consider whether we’ll be dragged out of a bath-
room and arrested or face a fistfight while our bladders are still ach-
ing . . . .  Human beings must use toilets.13 
Feinberg describes the violence that transgender people face in the 
bathroom: “If I go into the women’s bathroom, am I prepared for the 
shouting and shaming?  Will someone call security or the cops?  If I use 
the men’s room, am I willing to fight my way out?  Am I really ready for 
the violence that could ensue?”14 
The harassment and violence from civilians is bad, but police bru-
tality is often much worse. 
[P]olice officers often harass or abuse transgender and gender non-
conforming people regardless of which sex-segregated bathroom 
they use. This harassment intensifies when coupled with the stereo-
typing of trans people as sexual predators. As such, the use of the 
‘wrong’ bathroom . . . often results in arrests for crimes such as 
public lewdness, public obscenity, or public indecency. Refusing to 
comply with or simply questioning a police officer’s direction as to 
which bathroom the individual must use can often lead to charges 
such as resisting arrest or disorderly conduct.15 
                                                        
 10. TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER, THE PROBLEM, available at http://transgenderlawcenter.org/
trans/pdfs/SBAC%20Fact%20Sheet-lem%20handout.pdf. 
 11. Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001). 
 12. See Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (Mass. Super. Oct. 11, 2000) 
(school attempted to bar student from attending in clothes consistent with her gender identity and 
suspended her for using the women’s restroom). 
 13. LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANS LIBERATION: BEYOND PINK OR BLUE 68 (1998). 
 14. Id. at 68–69. 
 15. Pooja Gehi, Struggles from the Margins: Anti-Immigrant Legislation and the Impact on 
Low-Income Transgender People of Color, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 315, 326 (2009). 
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While the situation is unacceptable today, in the past it was much worse.  
One guidebook for transgender people published in 1995 advised trans-
gender people “to carry with [them] at all times a psychologist’s let-
ter . . . .”—like a passport in hostile territory—in case they were stopped 
by police.16  According to Amnesty International, “Bathroom access is-
sues become more of an issue with intersecting identities—people of 
color, homeless and young people are already under higher scrutiny.”17 
Activists have already organized significantly around this issue.  At 
the University of California—Santa Barbara, a team of students, staff, 
and community members founded an organization called People In 
Search of Safe and Accessible Restrooms (“PISSAR”) to lobby the 
school to make bathrooms safe and accessible for transgender and dis-
abled people.18  They were motivated by the fact that “[f]or those of us 
whose appearance or identity does not quite match the ‘man’ or ‘woman’ 
signs on the door, bathrooms can be the sites of violence and harassment, 
making it very difficult for us to use them safely or comfortably.”19  Ac-
tivists have even set up a website, Safe2Pee.org, to “create a resource 
where people who do not feel comfortable with traditional public re-
strooms can find safe alternatives.”20 
B.  Bathroom Discrimination Reflects Broader Animus 
Restricting the ability to use bathrooms has long served as yet 
another way to marginalize minority and disempowered groups.  As C.J. 
Griffin writes, discriminatory bathroom rules are “a tool of oppression 
used against many individuals and communities.”21  As Griffin points 
out, “[T]he lack of bathroom facilities has been an excuse to keep wom-
en out of areas traditionally dominated by men. For example, history 
suggests that women were only allowed into Yale Medical School after a 
female applicant’s wealthy father donated money to build a women’s 
restroom.”22  As for race, the South’s notorious Jim Crow laws were de-
signed to ensure white hegemony as much as to prescribe social norms.  
“Racially-segregated facilities taught both whites and blacks that certain 
                                                        
 16. SHEILA KIRK, M.D. & MARTINE ROTHBLATT, J.D., MEDICAL, LEGAL & WORKPLACE 
ISSUES FOR THE TRANSSEXUAL: A GUIDE FOR SUCCESSFUL TRANSFORMATION 114 (1995). 
 17. AMNESTY INT’L, STONEWALLED: POLICE ABUSE AND MISCONDUCT AGAINST LESBIAN, 
GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN THE U.S. 20 (2005), http://www.amnestyusa.org/ou
tfront/stonewalled/report.pdf. 
 18. SIMONE CHESS, ET AL., Calling all restroom revolutionaries!, in THAT’S REVOLTING: 
QUEER STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING ASSIMILATION 216–17 (Matt Bernstein Sycamore ed., Soft Skull 
Press 2008). 
 19. Id. at 217. 
 20. SAFE2PEE.ORG, http://safe2pee.org (last visited March 2, 2010). 
 21. Griffin, supra note 7, at 410. 
 22. Id. at 420. 
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kinds of contacts were forbidden because whites would be degraded by 
the contact with the blacks . . . .  [Often] in the workplace, blacks had to 
travel great distances to use the restroom, while white restrooms were 
generally just off the shop floor.”23 
Ratcheting up the rhetoric around bathroom discrimination is nei-
ther a contemporary phenomenon, nor has its exclusive focus or purpose 
been to marginalize transgender people.  It began in a more opaque form 
with the movement opposing passage of a federal Equal Rights Amend-
ment.  The proposed Amendment, passed by both houses of Congress in 
1972, would have added to the Constitution a provision stating, “Equality 
of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of sex.” 
Although the ERA garnered significant support among the states, it 
ultimately came up three states shy of ratification (thirty-eight states be-
ing required) because of substantial efforts by its opponents.  The most 
prominent critic and opponent of the ERA was Phyllis Schlafly, a con-
servative activist and founder of the Eagle Forum.  Schlafly strongly 
pushed the bathroom argument to stir up fears about the impact of the 
ERA on gender norms.  She also focused on the impact of the ERA on 
the military and on marriage.24  As one pamphlet distributed by Schlaf-
ly’s Eagle Forum stated: “ERA will not protect privacy between the sex-
es in hospitals, prisons, schools, or public accommodations.”25 
Many scholars and commentators today either ridicule the shared 
bathroom objection or marginalize its seriousness relative to the impor-
tance of having a sex-based nondiscrimination commitment.26  Yet, the 
centrality of the bathroom objection to ERA opponents’ arguments is 
clear.  Historians acknowledge it, and in a 2007 article discussing efforts 
by members of Congress to reintroduce the ERA, the Washington Post 
characterized Schlafly’s opposition as focusing on “women being drafted 
                                                        
 23. Id. at 424 (internal citations omitted). 
 24. JANE MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (Univ. Chicago Press 1986). 
 25. EAGLE FORUM, ERA—DO YOU KNOW WHAT IT MEANS?, http://www.eagleforum.org/ 
era/2003/ERA-Brochure.shtml (July 6, 2010). 
 26. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 24; Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement, 
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1339 
(2006) (referring to the current debate about the ERA as focusing on “some funny business about 
bathrooms and bras.”); Martha Craig Daughtrey, Women and the Constitution; Where we are at the 
End of the Century, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23 (April 2000) (suggesting that the failure of the ERA did 
not significantly hurt women because “[w]hen Congress sent the equal rights amendment to the 
states for ratification in 1972, ERA opponents warned of dire consequences: co-ed bathrooms, wom-
en drafted into the military [and] the repeal of spousal support laws . . . .  The ERA failed, but the 
consequences happened anyway.  Unisex bathrooms are in college dorms around the country.”). 
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by the military and . . . public unisex bathrooms.”27 Opponents of the 
ERA offered no explanation for their concern regarding shared restroom 
usage.28  They relied, in much the same way as opponents of transgender 
nondiscrimination laws do, on the visceral reaction people had to the 
suggestion that norms around bathroom access might change. 
While the federal ERA captured national attention, many states 
adopted local civil rights laws to prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
sex in employment, education, credit, housing, and public accommoda-
tions, among other areas.  Some of these states, prompted by Schlafly’s 
activism, included bathroom exceptions to their nondiscrimination 
laws.29  Not one recorded case exists in any state—from before or after 
the passage of these laws—in which a plaintiff challenged the constitu-
tionality of sex-segregated bathrooms under a state ERA.  The existence 
of these statutory exceptions, however, speaks to the influence of Schlaf-
ly and others on the debate and the centrality of bathroom hysteria to that 
legislative development.30 
C.  Bathrooms as the Focus of Anti-Transgender Activism Today 
While Schlafly presented fears of a unisex bathroom revolution 
where women would be forced to share space with men, subsequent con-
servative activists have narrowed the bathroom argument to focus pri-
                                                        
 27. Juliet Eilperin, New Drive Afoot to Pass Equal Rights Amendment, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/27/AR2007032702357.html. 
 28. See generally FLORA DAVIS, MOVING THE MOUNTAIN: THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN 
AMERICA SINCE 1960 390 (1999) (discussing types of arguments used in oppositions of the Equal 
Rights Amendment); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE 
LAW 68–69 (1989) (discussing the traditional distinction maintained between the sexes). 
 29. For example, Rhode Island adopted a rule of interpretation at the time it passed a state law 
prohibiting sex discrimination explaining that “[n]othing contained in [the nondiscrimination laws] 
that refers to ‘sex’ shall be construed to mandate joint use of restrooms . . . by males and females.”  
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-3.1 (2009).  (There are no reported cases dealing with this law.)  New Jer-
sey is another state which when it added “sex” to its nondiscrimination laws, created an exemption 
from its laws for public accommodations that are usually single-sex.  See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 
10:5-12(f)(1) (2010) (“nothing contained herein shall be construed to bar any place of public ac-
commodation which is in its nature reasonably restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex, and 
which shall include but not be limited to any summer camp, day camp, or resort camp, bathhouse, 
dressing room, swimming pool, gymnasium, comfort station, dispensary, clinic or hospital, or school 
or educational institution which is restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex, provided individ-
uals shall be admitted based on their gender identity or expression. . . .”).  So too in New Mexico, 
state law exempts bathrooms from the sex discrimination laws.  N.M. STAT. § 28-1-9(E) (2010).  
(There are no reported cases dealing with this law.)  Minnesota also has a bathroom exception to the 
public accommodations provision of the sex discrimination law. MINN. STAT. § 363A.24 (2010). 
Notably, all four of these states have since added laws prohibiting discrimination based on gender 
identity and expression that make no reference to the earlier bathroom exceptions. 
 30. Martha F. Davis, The Equal Rights Amendment: Then and Now, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & 
L. 419, 445–46 (2008) (“An extensive search has revealed no case brought under any state ERA 
challenging the norm of public single-sex bathrooms.”). 
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marily on transgender people.  That focus has intensified over time as 
more and more states have added gender identity and expression as ex-
plicitly protected characteristics. 
In Rhode Island, for instance, adding gender identity and expres-
sion to the nondiscrimination law raised little debate at all and included 
no specific emphasis on bathrooms.  There was one public hearing on the 
bill; the discussion focused almost entirely on legislators’ confusion as to 
why adding sexual orientation back in 1995 was insufficient to cover 
transgender people.  The scant legislative history reflects that “[g]ender 
identity and expression” was added to the public accommodations nondi-
scrimination law in 2001 to “close [the] loophole” within the then-
current civil rights laws that failed to explicitly protect transgender 
people from discrimination by extending to transgender people “the same 
basic rights to housing, employment and public access afforded to other 
members of the community.”31 
Over time, however, objections based on bathroom concerns have 
gained strength. Recent experiences advocating for such legislation in 
Connecticut and Massachusetts reveal that a major point of opposition to 
transgender equality laws focuses on the impact such laws would have 
on bathroom usage.32 
In Massachusetts, activists closely modeled their strategy to add 
gender identity to the nondiscrimination law on the Rhode Island expe-
rience.  The language of the bills is nearly identical.  In the Massachu-
setts experience, the first public hearing was before the Joint Committee 
on the Judiciary.  The experience of that public hearing, however, was 
markedly different from the one in Rhode Island.  In Massachusetts, do-
zens of transgender people poignantly testified about their experiences of 
discrimination across a range of issue areas, including employment, edu-
cation, public accommodations, public safety, and others. 
The opposition, however, painted the entire pro-transgender equali-
ty effort as “the bathroom bill,” and focused on that almost exclusively.  
In a publication titled “Yes, HB1728 is a ‘Bathroom Bill,’” and with a 
heading reading, “Protect Women and Children,” the Massachusetts 
Family Institute (“MFI”) claimed that under the law. 
                                                        
 31. Press Release, The Legislative Press and Public Information Bureau, Bill Would Extend 
Civil Rights to Transgendered Persons (May 2, 2001), 
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/leg_press/2001/may/Ajello%20civilrights.htm (quoting Representative 
Edith H. Ajello, sponsor of the bill that ultimately enacted 2001-H5920A). 
 32. Amy Contrada, The Coming Nightmare of a Transsexual Rights and Hate Crimes Law in 
Massachusetts: Why Bill H1722 Must Be Defeated; Part 3: Public Accommodations, 
MASSRESISTANCE (2008), http://www.massresistance.org/docs/govt08/tran_law_study/part3.html. 
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any man can legally gain access to facilities reserved for women 
and girls by indicating, verbally or non-verbally, that he inwardly 
feels female at the moment.  There is no way to distinguish between 
someone suffering from “Gender Identity Disorder” and a sexual 
predator looking to exploit this law.  This is the dangerous reality of 
this bill.33 
MFI set up a website, NoBathroomBill.com, featuring a YouTube 
video of a threatening-looking man following a young girl into a bath-
room.34  It attempted to deflect allegations of anti-transgender bias by 
stating, “We believe that transgender persons should enjoy the same le-
gal protections as other citizens and be free of harm or harassment[,] . . . 
but invading everyone else’s privacy and safety is going too far.”35  Yet, 
the underlying message came through.  One speaker in opposition to the 
bill stated, 
I know from teaching young children for so many years that they 
are so innocent. Seeing an adult, or older child dressed very diffe-
rently, especially in and around the school, would be extremely 
frightening to many young children, not to mention the comfort lev-
el of other adults working in the school.36 
According to Kris Mineau, the leader of MFI, upon adoption of the 
proposed bill, “[n]othing would prevent a sexual predator from pretend-
ing that he is confused about his sex to gain access to vulnerable women 
and children in public restrooms. . . .”37  Opposition by the organization 
MassResistance focused similarly on objections to bathroom usage but 
characterized the impact of the law in even more extreme ways.  Accord-
ing to a report the organization prepared in opposition to the bill, “[t]here 
will also be demands for gender-neutral single-person restrooms in all 
publicly accessible places, already the rage at colleges across the coun-
try—a very expensive add-on.”38  Opponents of transgender equality 
                                                        
 33. Legislative Brief, Mass. Family Inst., Yes, HB 1728 is a Bathroom Bill (2008), 
http://www.nobathroombill.com/resources/mfilegislatorbrief02.htm. 
 34. No Bathroom Bill, NoBathroomBill.com Ad #1, YOUTUBE (MAR. 17, 2009), http://www.yo
utube.com/watch?v=GWDA4IGyY-s. 
 35. Frequently Asked Questions, NO BATHROOM BILL http://www.nobathroombill.com/ 
faqs.htm (last visited March 3, 2010). 
 36. Deborah Furtado, Remarks at the Press Conference at Great Hall, State House, Boston, 
Mass. (April 8, 2009), http://www.nobathroombill.com/resources/furtadoremarks.htm. 
 37. Kris Mineau, President, Mass. Family Inst., Testimony Before the Judiciary Committee in 
Opposition to HB 1728 (July 14, 2009), 
http://www.nobathroombill.com/judiciaryhearing.htm#mineau (last visited July 4, 2010). 
 38. Contrada, supra note 32. 
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have used similar arguments across the country to fight bills in Mary-
land,39 Colorado,40 Michigan,41 and Florida.42 
Bathroom-centered objections to transgender rights have appeared 
at the federal level as well.  In response to the news that President Ob-
ama had come out in favor of a transgender-inclusive Employment Non-
discrimination Act, right-wing religious organization Americans for 
Truth About Homosexuality, brainchild of long-time right-wing activist 
Peter LaBarbera, released a press statement asking, “So will an Obama 
Administration allow these big-boned men in female clothing to use la-
dies’ restrooms in federal buildings?  What will a President Obama do to 
protect the right to privacy of female federal workers who don’t want 
men wearing dresses—with male genitalia—sharing their women’s re-
stroom?”43 
What is clear from all of these examples is that opponents use a 
predictable set of themes to argue broadly against transgender equality as 
much as to focus on any real concerns about bathroom access or privacy.  
As we discuss below, the same themes appear not only in the bathroom 
discrimination case law, but also in the cross-dressing cases. 
III.  BATHROOM DISCRIMINATION: ANALYSIS OF THE CASE LAW 
A small handful of published cases discuss the rights of transgender 
people to access the appropriate bathroom.  Just as in the cross-dressing 
cases analyzed in the next section, the tropes are easily categorized.  The 
courts and defendants justify denying transgender people access to a 
                                                        
 39. Montgomery County, Md., Bill 23-07, Maryland Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Law 
(Nov 13, 2007) (enacted); H.B. 474/S.B. 566 Human Relations—Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity—Antidiscrimination, HB 474/SB 566, 426th Sess. (Md. 2009). 
 40. S.B. 08-200, 2008 Leg., (Co. 2008) (enacted).  Focus on the Family targeted Colorado’s 
gender identity bill, declaring in a flier that “Colorado Just Opened its Public Bathrooms to Either 
Sex!” accompanied by a picture of a scared young girl cowering in a bathroom stall with a large man 
nearby.  FOCUS ON THE FAMILY ACTION, LEAFLET, COLORADO JUST OPENED ITS PUBLIC 
BATHROOMS TO EITHER SEX! (undated) (on file with author). 
 41. Kalamazoo, Mich., Ordinance 1856, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimi-
nation Law (Nov. 3, 2009).  The organization Kalamazoo Citizens Voting No to Special Rights sent 
out a mailer stating: “[O]ne could declare himself to be of the opposite sex and use facilities like 
restrooms, locker rooms, and showers . . . .  ‘Gender Identity’ makes it legal for anyone to declare 
himself to be any sex he chooses at any time.”  KALAMAZOO CITIZENS VOTING NO TO SPECIAL 
RIGHTS, MAILER, IS THERE A MAN IN YOUR DAUGHTER’S BATHROOM? (2009) (on file with author). 
 42. Gainesville, Fla., Ordinance 051225, Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Law (Jan. 28, 
2008).  See also, Citizens for Good Public Policy, Citizens for Good Public Policy—Commercial, 
YOUTUBE (June 17, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ExGBlXKRrYs (last visited July 4, 
2010). 
 43. Press Release, Americans for Truth About Homosexuality, Will Federal Female Employees 
Be Safe from Cross-Dressing Men Using Ladies’ Restrooms in the Obama Administration? (Nov. 
10, 2008), http://americansfortruth.com/news/will-federal-female-employees-be-safe-from-cross-
dressing-men-using-ladies%E2%80%99-restrooms-in-the-obama-administration.html. 
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bathroom consistent with their gender identity, even in states where such 
discrimination is expressly prohibited, by (1) some generalized fear of 
crime; (2) the need to prevent gender “fraud,” (3) heteronormativity; and 
(4) a social need to enforce sex stereotypes. 
Most importantly, in every case denying a transgender person’s 
right to access the bathroom consistent with the person’s gender identity, 
the logic of discrimination easily extends to other legal protections for 
transgender people and threatens to undermine the purpose of the laws.  
We discussed above how nondiscriminatory bathroom access is a fun-
damental health need.  Here, we show how it is also a crucial legal right 
and that those who seek to deny it also seek to deny transgender people 
equality in a range of contexts, including employment. 
A.  Preventing Fraud and Crime 
Concerns over the possibility of fraud and crime are framed in a va-
riety of ways by defendants in the bathroom cases.  Whether as a matter 
of safety or privacy, the underlying message emerging from these cases 
is that transgender people are perceived to be sexually threatening.  In 
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, the defendant argued, “Women have 
legitimate concerns about privacy and safety underlying their desire not 
to share restrooms, showers or dressing rooms with men, which are not 
motivated by animus against men and which do not result in societal dis-
advantage to men.”44  The defendant, a public-transportation provider in 
Utah, also argued that allowing the plaintiff to use the women’s restroom 
would interfere with its ability “to maintain an image of professionalism 
and of a safe environment for [its] customers.”45 The defendant stated 
that it had a “legitimate reason to be concerned that women may be up-
set, offended, embarrassed or frightened by a biological male with male 
genitalia using the same women’s restroom,” ignoring the fact that the 
plaintiff, a transit worker, presented as female.46  In another case,  Som-
mers v. Budget Marketing, the court stated that while “[w]e are not un-
mindful of the problem [the plaintiff] faces[,] . . . [the defendant] faces a 
problem in protecting the privacy interests of its female employees.”47  
Even in the absence of evidence to support the argument, the court held 
for the defendant. 
A more interesting argument is that allowing a transgender person 
to use the right bathroom could incite others to violence.  This echoes the 
                                                        
 44. Brief of Appellees Utah Transit Authority and Betty Shirley at 32, Etsitty v. Utah Transit 
Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-4193). 
 45. Id. at 27. 
 46. Id. at 31–32. 
 47. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th. Cir. 1982). 
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mindset that queer people are to blame when they are attacked by others 
out of panic and ignorance.48  In Cruzan v. Minnesota Public School Sys-
tem, the court held that a school district had not violated a non-
transgender female teacher’s rights by allowing a transgender female to 
use the bathroom.49  The defendants in Etsitty distinguished their situa-
tion from that faced by the complainants in Cruzan by arguing that they 
were “concerned about members of the general public over whom it has 
no control, as opposed to coworkers such as Ms. Cruzan, who can be 
trained and informed.”50  In a Maine case, the defendant made a similar 
argument, stating that “letting complainant use the female restroom 
would potentially cause an altercation and involve police.”51  Of course, 
the defendants ignored the very real safety risks involved in forcing a 
female-identified person to use the men’s room and had no data upon 
which to rely to advance their arguments. 
B.  Enforcing Gender Norms, Discouraging Homosexuality 
The importance of maintaining gender and sexuality norms also 
looms over many of the bathroom decisions.  Several courts treat bath-
room access for transgender people as a bridge too far, after which all 
reasonable gender-based restrictions would fall.  In Etsitty, a transgender 
employee of the Utah Transportation Authority brought federal discrimi-
nation claims against her employer for unlawful termination.  The defen-
dants admitted that “at the time of the termination, [the Utah Transporta-
tion Authority] had received no complaints about Ms. Etsitty’s perfor-
mance, appearance, or restroom usage,” yet they fired her in anticipation 
of such a reaction.52  The defendants argued that holding in favor of a 
transgender person’s right to access the correct bathroom would be like 
having “a federally protected right for male workers to wear nail polish 
and dresses and speak in falsetto and mince about in high heels, or for 
female ditch diggers to strip to the waist in hot weather.”53 
The result in Etsitty highlights the degree to which bathroom access 
is central to transgender equality.  Of course, some women, transgender 
and non-transgender, do seek to wear dresses, nail polish, and high heels.  
The defendants in Etsitty were not only arguing against transgender 
                                                        
 48. See Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insuffi-
cient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 133 (1992) (arguing that “judges should hold as a matter of 
law that a homosexual advance is not sufficient provocation to incite a reasonable man to kill”). 
 49. Cruzan v. Minn. Pub. Sch. Sys., 165 F. Supp. 2d 964 (D. Minn. 2001). 
 50. Brief of Appellees, supra note 44, at 32. 
 51. ME. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, INVESTIGATOR’S REPORT, PA08-0212 3 (April 29, 2009) 
(on file with author). 
 52. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 53. Brief of Appellees, supra note 44, at 32. 
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people using the bathroom, but against any sort of protections for trans-
gender women in the workplace.  Moreover, the language of “mincing” 
and speaking in a feminine way calls for employers to retain the right to 
discipline and terminate non-masculine men, gay and non-gay.  Not sur-
prisingly, in Utah, the state in which this case was brought, gay men of 
any gender expression are denied protections. 
The Etsitty defendants also argued against the plaintiff’s claim that 
termination based on bathroom access is unconstitutional sex-
stereotyping prohibited under the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.54 
[I]f something as drastic as a biological man’s attempt to dress and 
appear as a woman and use women’s restrooms is simply a failure 
to conform to the male stereotype, and nothing more, then there is 
no social custom or practice associated with a particular sex that is 
not a stereotype. And if that is the case, then any male employee 
could dress as a woman, use female restrooms, shower rooms and 
locker rooms, and any attempt by the employer to prohibit such 
conduct would constitute sex stereotyping in violation of Title 
VII.55 
The brief also argued that “[w]e live in a relatively conservative area and 
I think there are expectations of the customer in how a [public transit] 
employee is going to behave, and if a customer sees a bus operator enter-
ing a female restroom one day and a male restroom another day, that can 
be pretty disconcerting.”56  This argument, along with the bridge too far 
doomsday predictions addressed above, precisely echo the Schlafly-style 
hyperbole of ERA opposition. 
Despite the contentions in the defendants’ briefs, several of the de-
cisions dealing with bathroom discrimination fail to discuss the defen-
dants’ reasoning for restricting transgender people’s access.  It is treated 
either as a point of common sense or a matter meriting no discussion.  In 
one case, the court noted, without commentary, that the plaintiff’s “mi-
srepresentation led to a disruption of the company’s work routine in that 
a number of female employees indicated they would quit if [the plaintiff] 
were permitted to use the restroom facilities assigned to female person-
nel.”57  Their motivation for quitting was not even addressed.  In another 
                                                        
 54. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  In that case, “[t]he Court held that 
evidence of sex stereotyping is ‘legal[ly] relevan[t]’ in the context of Title VII,” and that “[i]n the 
specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman 
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”  Ilona Turner, Sex 
Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CAL. L. REV. 561, 572 (2007). 
 55. Brief of Appellees, supra note 44, at 20. 
 56. Id. at 27. 
 57. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748, 748–49 (8th Cir. 1982). 
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case, the court merely stated that defendants prohibited the transgender 
plaintiff from using the bathroom, ignoring why they would take this 
tack.58  The same occurred in an Ohio case, in which the plaintiff em-
ployee who had presented as female for ten years was told to use the 
men’s room because she had not changed the gender marker on her driv-
er’s license, which required evidence of a course of surgery.59 
C.  Rationales for Denying Access Despite Transgender-Inclusive Nondi-
scrimination Laws 
The success of these common rationales for denying bathroom-
based discrimination cases is most disturbing, perhaps, in those states 
with transgender-inclusive nondiscrimination laws.  In those instances, 
the same arguments—the dangerousness of transgender people and the 
importance of preserving gender norms—figured prominently, notwith-
standing the settled state policy reflected in the adoption of laws specifi-
cally enumerating the characteristic of gender identity or gender expres-
sion as protected. 
The most notorious of these cases is Goins v. West Publishing, a 
Minnesota Supreme Court decision.  In 1997, Julie Goins began em-
ployment with West Publishing in its Rochester, New York facility.60  
Consistent with her female gender identity, Ms. Goins used the women’s 
restroom at work without any problems from coworkers.61  It was not 
until she transferred to West’s Minnesota facility later that year that she 
began to have trouble.  During a pre-relocation visit, several of Ms. 
Goins’s soon-to-be coworkers complained to their supervisors about her 
use of the women’s restroom.62  On the morning of her first day of work 
at the Minnesota facility, the director of human resources informed Ms. 
Goins that she could not use the women’s restroom facility.63  Ms. Goins 
attempted to negotiate with the company over their newly articulated 
policy that required restroom use according to what the company deter-
mined to be a person’s “biological gender.”  But after a short time and 
being threatened with “disciplinary action if she continued to disregard 
the restroom use policy,” Ms. Goins tendered her resignation, explaining 
that the company policy was hostile to her and caused her undue stress.64  
                                                        
 58. Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 850 F. Supp. 284, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
 59. Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 98 Fed. App’x 461, 461 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 60. Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Minn. 2001). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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Despite being offered a promotion and substantial salary increase, she 
left employment with West. 
Ms. Goins filed an action against West alleging constructive termi-
nation.  She claimed both that the policy itself discriminated against her 
impermissibly and that the conduct of West employees had created an 
unlawful hostile work environment.65  Ms. Goins’s claim of discrimina-
tion was grounded in Minnesota’s prohibition against discrimination on 
the basis of “having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity 
not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or female-
ness.”66  Her claim was that the policy that required restroom use based 
on “biological gender” was precisely the type of adverse treatment pro-
scribed by the law.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with her 
seemingly straightforward analysis, finding that Ms. Goins had stated a 
prima facie case of direct evidence of discriminatory motive by showing 
that West’s policy denied her the use of the female restroom facility 
“based on the inconsistency between her self-image and her anatomy.”67 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, disagreed and granted 
West’s motion for summary judgment.68  According to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, notwithstanding the language of the state law protecting 
against adverse treatment based on the inconsistency of self-image and 
maleness or femaleness, “where financially feasible, the traditional and 
accepted practice in the employment setting is to provide restroom facili-
ties that reflect the cultural preference for restroom designation based on 
biological gender.”69  The court went on to explain that “absent more 
express guidance from the legislature,” it would not undermine the em-
ployer’s ability to create a workplace restroom policy that reflects what it 
perceived as widely enforced cultural and social practices.70  In other 
words, social norms trumped legislative language. 
Notably, the court’s analysis regarding the relationship between so-
cial norms and the legislative language cited only one case—one that 
actually dismissed the hostile work environment claims brought by sev-
eral teachers objecting to a transgender colleague’s use of the female re-
stroom at a school.71  The court offered no other support in case law, le-
                                                        
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 722 (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.03(1)(2)(c) (2000)).  Under Minnesota law, “sexual 
orientation” is defined to include the more common categories of “gender identity and expression.” 
MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(44) (2004). 
 67. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 723. 
 68. Id. at 726. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 723. 
 71. Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 31706 (Dep’t of Human Rights Aug. 26, 1999); 
rev’d by Cruzan v. Minn. Public Sch. Sys., 165 F. Supp. 2d 964 (D. Minn. 2001) (granting defendant 
school district’s motion for summary judgment, holding that female teacher had failed to establish 
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gal doctrine, or even canons of construction for its analysis.  Making the 
analysis even more questionable is the fact that Minnesota’s nondiscri-
mination law, well prior to including transgender people within its pur-
view, had an express exclusion to the sex discrimination law for re-
strooms.72  Apparently, the court simply ignored that exclusion and any 
relevant legislative history and found it more appropriate to deny the 
claim by imagining how a legislature that never was asked to address the 
issue would have addressed it if asked. 
In the same year as the Goins decision, however, a federal district 
court in Cruzan v. Minnesota Public School System held as a matter of 
Minnesota law that allowing a transgender person to use a gender-
concordant bathroom did not create a hostile work environment for an 
anti-transgender coworker.73  The American Center for Law and Justice, 
a religious conservative public-interest law firm, brought the case on be-
half of a public school teacher.74  The teacher argued that permitting a 
transgender woman to use the women’s restroom violated her religious 
freedom and created a hostile work environment.75  The court rejected 
both of these claims, holding that “plaintiff fail[ed] to show that allowing 
Davis to use the female faculty restroom has created a working condition 
that rises to the level of an abusive environment.  In fact, Cruzan ac-
knowledges that she did not even notice Davis’s use of this restroom for 
several months.”76  The federal court distinguished Cruzan from the facts 
in Goins because “unlike the plaintiff in Goins, Cruzan [the non-
transgender colleague who filed suit] has a choice of restrooms and is not 
being denied access to any workplace facility on the basis of her gend-
er.”77 
Unfortunately, Cruzan has been the exception rather than the rule.  
The effects of Goins have been felt beyond the borders of Minnesota.  
New York purports to protect transgender people under both disability 
and sex discrimination laws.78  Yet, despite that, in one New York case, 
                                                                                                                            
religious discrimination or hostile work environment due to school allowing male-to-female trans-
gender teacher to use the women’s restroom). 
 72. MINN. STAT § 363A.24(1) (2004). 
 73. Cruzan, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 968–69. 
 74. Id. at 965.  The American Center for Law and Justice website favorably cites a news report 
declaring that it has “‘led the way’ in Christian legal advocacy.”  Welcome from Jay Sekulow, 
AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, http://www.aclj.org/About/ (last visited July 5, 2010). 
 75. Cruzan, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 966. 
 76. Id. at 969. 
 77. Id. 
 78. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (2010).  See Rentos v. OCE-Office Sys., 1996 WL 737215 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding transgender employee stated valid claim of sex discrimination under New 
York State Human Rights Law); Doe v. Bell, 754 N.Y.S.2d 846 (2003) (holding that “GID is a disa-
bility [for purposes of] the State Human Rights Law” requiring reasonable accommodation). 
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the court found the Goins ruling “instructive,” and held that “the defen-
dants’ designation of restroom use, applied uniformly, on the basis of 
‘biological gender,’ rather than biological self-image, was not discrimi-
nation.”79  The court reasoned that “at this juncture, the only discernible 
claim set forth in the complaint is that plaintiff’s transgender clients were 
prohibited from using the restrooms not in conformance with their bio-
logical sex, as were all tenants.”80  The defendants stated that they 
“agree[d] that discrimination against transsexuals is abhorrent” but ar-
gued that “this case is only about bathrooms and is a case that deals with 
a situation which is dangerous to the public.”81  The defendants dis-
missed the argument in favor of allowing transgender people equal bath-
room access as an “absurdity,” saying that “there will be testimony [at 
trial] indicating the use by anatomical male transsexuals of women’s 
bathrooms, which were also being used by [five, six, and seven year-old 
girls] at the same time.”82  The case ultimately settled out of court in 
2005.83 
In Maine, by way of contrast, the state human rights commission 
has consistently rejected the Goins line of reasoning and protected the 
rights of transgender people to access the bathroom.  One case dealt with 
the right to access a bathroom in a restaurant.  The transgender complai-
nant challenged respondent restaurant’s policy prohibiting her from using 
the women’s restroom.84  The restaurant defendant proffered the familiar 
litany of arguments, asserting that allowing a transgender woman to use 
the restroom (1) invaded the “privacy” of biological women; (2) posed a 
“danger [to] young girls and children using the women’s restroom” of 
“being exposed to a man” because “there is a possibility of someone’s 
child peeking into a stall”; (3) had possibility to “cause an altercation and 
involve police”; and (4) opened “the door for a possible sex predator us-
ing the bathroom of the opposite sex on purpose.”85  The restaurant’s 
solution was for the transgender woman—who presented in a normative-
ly feminine way—to use the men’s room.  The commission rejected the 
argument and held for complainant.86 
                                                        
 79. Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).   
 80. Id. 
 81. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 1, Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 
43 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (No. 3820). 
 82. Id. at 2. 
 83. See Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Bruno, ACLU, March 16, 2005, http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-
rights_hiv-aids/hispanic-aids-forum-v-bruno. 
 84. See ME. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 51, at 3. 
 85. See ME. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 51, at 3. 
 86. See ME. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 51, at 3.  The complainant in that case has 
since filed a court action against the restaurant whose motion to dismiss the case was recently de-
nied. 
2010] Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom Equality 151 
The foregoing cases illustrate the power of the commonly-used ar-
guments against transgender people’s nondiscriminatory access to re-
strooms, even in states where gender expression is purportedly protected. 
IV.  CROSS-DRESSING LAWS: ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY AND CASE 
LAW 
The same types of arguments used in bathroom access cases—
preventing crime and fraud, discouraging homosexuality, and enforcing 
gender norms—were also all significant in the history and case law sur-
rounding the issue of cross-dressing.  Unlike the bathroom cases, howev-
er, the courts almost uniformly struck down the cross-dressing bans and 
in no instance sustained their use against a transgender defendant.  Their 
reasoning offers another set of arguments against bathroom discrimina-
tion, as we discuss in the final section of this Article. 
A.  History of Cross-Dressing Laws 
Sumptuary codes regulating dress based on sex, class, religion, and 
race date back to the Middle Ages.  As discussed by I. Bennett Capers in 
his article Cross-Dressing and the Criminal, “many of these laws served 
to inscribe and police social boundaries.”87  In Elizabethan England, the 
Queen “issued more royal brevets concerning dress than any prior mo-
narch.”  A royal proclamation in 1597 contained “dress prohibitions, 
from materials for headdresses, netherstocks, jerkins, hose, and doublets, 
depending on whether one was an earl or count or gentleman or had an 
annual income of 500 marks or more, or fell in some station in be-
tween.”88 
Sumptuary laws also played a role in marking racial and religious 
groups. 
A 1430 Venetian order, for example, mandated that all Jews identi-
fy themselves as Jewish by wearing on their chests yellow circles of 
cord; Rome required that male Jews wear red tabards and female 
Jews red overskirts. In [the U.S.], sumptuary laws limited the type 
of clothing that could be worn by black slaves. South Carolina’s 
slave code, for example, mandated that slaves could only wear ne-
gro cloth, duffelds, coarse kearsies, osnabrigs, blue linen, checked 
linen or coarse garlix or calicoes, checked cottons, or scotch plaids, 
not exceeding ten shillings per yard for the said checked cottons, 
scotch plaids, garlix or calico.89 
                                                        
 87. I. Bennett Capers, Cross-Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 7 (2008). 
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 89. Id. at 8. 
152 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:133 
The first American cross-dressing laws, however, arose 
[b]etween 1850 and 1870, just as the abolitionist movement, then 
the Civil War, and then Reconstruction were disrupting the subordi-
nate/superordinate balance between blacks and whites, just as mid-
dle class white women were demanding social and economic equali-
ty, agitating for the right to vote, and quite literally asserting their 
right to wear pants, and just as lesbian and gay subcultures were 
emerging in large cities, jurisdictions began passing sumptuary leg-
islation which had the effect of reifying sex and gender distinc-
tions.90 
Twenty-eight cities passed cross-dressing laws in the nineteenth 
century and an additional twelve passed laws in the twentieth century, 
with the most recent passed by Cincinnati in 1974.91  In the nineteenth 
century, this “wave of local legislation . . . represented a new develop-
ment,” according to historian Susan Stryker.92  “Cities of every size and 
in every part of the country adopted gender-normative sumptuary 
rules.”93  And into the 1970s and 1980s, they were routinely enforced.  
The city of Houston’s cross-dressing law, for instance, resulted in the 
arrests of fifty-three people in 1977.94 
Though these laws were ultimately used to punish people for their 
gender expression, in many states this was not the legislative intent.  In 
People v. Archibald, the dissenting judge identified the anti-criminality 
roots of the 1845 New York cross-dressing law.  “[T]he original sec-
tion,” he pointed out, “was enacted as part of an over-all policy aimed at 
ending the anti-rent riots, an armed insurrection by farmers in the Hud-
son Valley.”  The farmers, 
while disguised as “Indians,” murdered law enforcement officers at-
tempting to serve writs upon the farmers . . . .  [A]s part of their cos-
tumes, [they] wore women’s calico dresses to further conceal their 
identities . . . .  Indeed, males dressed in female attire for purposes 
other than discussed above were not even considered by the Legis-
lature adopting the section.95 
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In other states, however, gender norms did motivate the passage of 
these laws.  First, as women entered the public square, demands for more 
comfortable and less restrictive women’s clothing arose.  “Nineteenth 
century antifeminist opinion, which saw in feminism a threatened loss of 
distinction between men and women, considered dress reform to be tan-
tamount to cross-dressing,” echoing the opposition of Phylis Schlafly and 
her cohorts a century later.96 
The desire to keep women “in their place” and prevent them from 
assuming the privileges and status of men stemmed from the archaic 
sumptuary laws that regulated dress in Europe and pre-Revolutionary 
America.  These laws “were designed to regulate dress in order to mark 
out as visible and above all legible distinctions of wealth and rank within 
a society undergoing changes that threatened to blur or even obliterate 
such distinctions.”97  Since colonial times, laws barred people from wear-
ing clothes signifying certain professions or social classes and barred 
people from attempting to present themselves as a different race.98 
Second, cities passed cross-dressing laws to deal with the post-war 
stirrings of gay liberation.  In Chicago, they termed it “sexual deviance”; 
it was called “illegal deception” in California and New York.99  In Chi-
cago, the law was part of a broader legal effort to “urg[e] proper sex 
roles by proscribing dress, reading material, and behavior . . . as part of a 
general rule against public lewdness and indecency,” that is, to regulate 
homosexuality.100  There was a widespread perception among gay men 
and lesbians that they needed to avoid any sort of cross-dressing in order 
to steer clear of violating the law for wearing too few gender-appropriate 
garments.101  One author writes that there was an “understanding among 
gay men and lesbians in the 1950s and 1960s that they were subject to 
arrest unless they had on three garments appropriate to their gender.”102  
The cross-dressing laws, even when they were not borne out of the desire 
to enforce gender norms, functioned to keep gays and lesbians in fear of 
not conforming. 
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B.  Cross-Dressing Case Law 
As the courts began to strike down the cross-dressing laws as un-
constitutional, they rejected the four justifications—to be later echoed in 
the bathroom cases—put forward by the laws’ defenders: (1) concerns 
about fraud; (2) crime detection; (3) discouragement of overt homosex-
uality; and (4) maintaining widely held social norms of appropriate gen-
dered expression.  Not all of these arguments appear in each case, but 
these four categories neatly encapsulate the varieties of rhetoric em-
ployed by anti-transgender lawyers and activists. 
1.  Preventing Fraud and Crime 
Defenders of cross-dressing laws argued that the cross-dressing 
laws were needed to “protect citizens from being misled or defrauded,” 
“to aid in the description and detection of criminals,” and “to prevent 
crimes in washrooms.”103  In an unpublished case brought in Fort Worth, 
Texas, the court held, in contrast, that a cross-dressing “ordinance [was] 
invalid unless the impersonation is done for fraud.”104  The court refused 
to see in cross-dressing an implied fraud, as the law’s defenders urged.105  
In that instance, police visited a local gay bar “on a routine check” and 
arrested seven of its biologically male patrons for wearing evening 
gowns.106  They were charged, according to a contemporary news ac-
count, “with impersonating females under a city ordinance that makes it 
illegal for a man to wear clothing ‘not appropriate to his sex.’”107  The 
judge remarked that since he usually dismisses such cases, he couldn’t 
understand why the police continue[d] to use the ordinance to harass 
people.”108 
Another court held that the “preventing crime” justification was 
constitutionally permissible, yet held that the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional as applied to a transgender person, acknowledging that gender 
identity was central to the person’s public and private sense of self, re-
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gardless of anatomy or physiology.109  In that case, the court held “com-
mon sense and experience discloses that this ordinance has a real and 
substantial relation to the public safety and general welfare.  There are 
numerous subjects who would want to change their sex identity in order 
to perpetrate crimes of homicide, rape, robbery, assault, etc.”110  The 
court cited no studies, case law, or other authority for this assertion.  
Notably, however, no fraud concern could support the law’s application 
to a transgender person whose dress and appearance reflected her female 
gender identity.111 
2.  Enforcing Gender Norms 
Other proponents of the cross-dressing prohibitions argued that en-
forcing gender norms was necessary to protect the public peace.  In a 
transphobic iteration of the “she was asking for it” argument, lawyers 
argued in Mayes v. Texas that “[a]n ineffective [cross-gender] disguise 
may engender cat-calls and slurring remarks leading to a breach of the 
peace. An efficient disguise could lead to trouble after an acquaintance is 
formed with the disguise and the true sex is disclosed when the friend-
ship becomes amorous.”112  In another case, the city’s attorneys de-
scribed the enforcement of gender norms as an effort “to prevent inhe-
rently antisocial conduct which is contrary to the accepted norms of our 
society.”  This likely refers to the discouragement of homosexuality and 
demonstrates how, even before the emergence of an explicitly “LGBT” 
community, our opponents thought of us as one entity.113 
In another case, even as it dismissed the charge against the defen-
dant, the court discussed the validity of cross-dressing laws for enforcing 
gender norms.  In People v. Simmons,114 the defendant was arrested after 
being reported by the complainant, who believed the defendant to be a 
female prostitute.115  The court’s description of the facts of the case re-
veals that the defendant offered “to take care” of the complainant for 
$10.116  In response, the complainant invited the defendant into his car 
and drove to a nearby dead-end street.117  It is not clear what transpired 
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between the defendant and the complainant, but the court’s description 
states that at some point the complainant flagged down a police car and 
accused the defendant of stealing money from him while the two of them 
were in the car.118  In response, the police arrested Simmons, who was 
charged with larceny, prostitution, and “criminal impersonation.”119 
The focus of the court’s analysis was on the legitimacy of Sim-
mons’s gender expression.  The opening three sentences of the opinion 
were, “The defendant is a male.  When arrested he wore a woman’s wig, 
dress, makeup and shoes.  Following arrest he was searched, and his true 
sex was discovered.”120  Ultimately, the court dismissed the charge of 
criminal impersonation because it required proof that the person charged 
was impersonating “another,” and in this case, no such impersonation 
could be shown.121 
Not content to simply dismiss the criminal impersonation charge, 
the court opined at length about the significance and vibrancy of cross-
dressing prohibitions.  The court cited Deuteronomy 22:5, “The woman 
shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man, neither shall a man put 
on a woman’s garment:  for all that do so are abomination unto the Lord, 
thy God,” to support, in part, its conclusion that cross-dressing prohibi-
tions broadly exist and reflect societal norms.122  The court went even 
further to search for solutions in anthropology or biology for the deep 
commitment to social norms: “The anthropologists can perhaps explain 
whether this intolerance of cross-dressing characterizes other societies.  
Biologists may theorize that in the lower animal species, inability of the 
male and female of the species to recognize each other’s differences may 
lead to frustration of the reproductive urge.”123  Regardless of the source, 
the court concluded that cross-dressing prohibitions existed broadly 
across the country, sometimes focusing on “transvestism” and other 
times focusing on “concealment of identity.”124  Either way, the court 
concluded, consistent with the other cases, that the state has the authority 
to prohibit cross-dressing.125 
In another case, the arrest seemed based on the police officer’s per-
sonal offense at being confronted by a cross-dressing person.126  In Arc-
hibald, the defendant was arrested and charged with the offense of va-
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grancy, a code subsection apparently titled “impersonating a female.”127  
According to the majority opinion, the arresting officer reported that he 
had observed a group of three people engaged in loud conversation at 
four in the morning on a subway station platform.128  One of the individ-
uals, who was “wearing a white evening dress, high heel shoes, blonde 
wig, female undergarments,129 and facial makeup,”130 had the misjudg-
ment to wink at the officer and walk away from him.131  After the wink-
ing incident, the officer asked the defendant whether he was a boy or 
girl, and when the individual responded, “I am a girl,”132 the officer ar-
rested him.  The court sustained the arrest.133 
From the majority opinion, one can discern no context for the un-
derlying conduct and might even suppose, from a contemporary perspec-
tive, the legitimacy of the appearance based on the defendant having a 
female identity.134  It is only the dissenting justice who points out that the 
defendant had been at a masquerade party that night and was on his way 
home when the interaction with law enforcement occurred.  Unlike the 
majority, the dissent found the local law that apparently criminalized ap-
pearing in public (and winking at a police officer) to be “an invalid exer-
cise of the State’s police power.”135 
3.  Discouraging Homosexuality 
Others argued that the prevention of homosexuality was the core is-
sue of public policy at stake in banning cross-dressing.  The City of Hou-
ston’s lawyers articulated this stance in their briefs urging the Supreme 
Court to deny certiorari in Mayes v. Texas, a case challenging the city’s 
cross-dressing law.136  The lawyers argued that 
[s]ociety is presently thought to have an interest in barring homo-
sexual acts since homosexuality is, at least partially, an acquired or 
taught trait. Our society deems it important not to have its youth 
learning to be homosexual rather than heterosexual. This interest is 
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in part rooted in the survival of the race; procreation is necessary to 
ensure the continuation of the human race.137 
Because “dressing or disguising as a member of the opposite sex is a step 
toward creating homosexual relationships” it can be “proscribed in the 
same manner as more overt homosexual conduct.”138 
In Archibald, the dissent, which opposed application of a cross-
dressing law to a non-transgender biological man who was merely 
dressed as a woman for a masquerade party,  asserted that it was “within 
the province of legislative controls” to discourage “overt homosexuality 
in public places which is offensive to public morality.”139 
V.  THE CROSS-DRESSING CASE FOR BATHROOM EQUALITY 
The cross-dressing cases highlight the origins of the arguments that 
still dominate public conversation and misunderstanding of transgender 
issues.  The same justifications are still used by anti-transgender activists 
to fight against nondiscrimination laws and transgender-inclusive bath-
room policies: enforcement of gender norms, discouraging overt homo-
sexuality, and prevention of fraud and crime.  In this section, we com-
pare the cross-dressing and bathroom cases to show how the logic under-
pinning both types of discriminatory laws lacks a legal basis. 
A.  Preventing Fraud and Crime: A Tussman & tenBroek Analysis 
The fraud and crime fear looms large to this day, as evidenced by 
the public campaigns of anti-transgender activists across the country.  
The public hearings for the Massachusetts gender identity nondiscrimina-
tion law (like those for similar laws in other states) provide clear proof 
that the same beliefs and fears that animated the cross-dressing laws con-
tinue to fuel anti-transgender activism.  But in both the cross-dressing 
and bathroom contexts, these crime-prevention arguments fall flat.  The 
simultaneously overinclusive and underinclusive nature of the bathroom 
and cross-dressing prohibitions renders both of them constitutionally 
questionable.  This is highlighted by the classic equal protection analysis 
advanced by Professors Tussman and tenBroek in their article, The Equal 
Protection of the Laws.140 
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The professors argued that 
[t]he Constitution does not require that things different in fact be 
treated in law as though they were the same. But it does require, in 
its concern for equality, that those who are similarly situated be si-
milarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of a classifica-
tion is the degree of its success in treating similarly those similarly 
situated.141 
Thus, “[a] reasonable classification is one which includes all persons 
who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.”142  As 
a result, “[i]t is impossible to pass judgment on the reasonableness of a 
classification without taking into consideration, or identifying, the pur-
pose of the law.”143 
The professors reject the argument that a law is constitutionally 
permissible under the Equal Protection Clause merely because it treats all 
people targeted by the law in the same way.  In fact, there are two cate-
gories to examine.  “The first class consists of all individuals possessing 
the defining Trait (T)” targeted by the legislation.  “The second class 
consists of all individuals possessing, or rather, tainted by, the Mischief 
(M) at which the law aims,” that is, all those “similarly situated with re-
spect to the purpose of the law.”144 
In their wide-ranging analysis, the professors analyze those laws 
that manage to be simultaneously “underinclusive” and “overinclusive.”  
Both the cross-dressing and bathroom cases fit this category.  In both, the 
aim of the legislation or police action is to prevent crimes or fraud by 
those using a disguise to evade police detection. This legislation tar-
gets—and, indeed, ends up focusing almost exclusively on—transgender 
people. 
As for preventing disguises meant to confuse police, the law is un-
derinclusive insofar as it fails to include every type of disguise that could 
fool police into thinking a person is an innocent passerby (e.g., dressing 
up as a nurse, an Amish person, a tourist, or any other stereotypical cate-
gory of people not generally thought to have criminal intentions).  The 
professors concede that underinclusive laws should usually be upheld, 
nonetheless, because of the “administrative” difficulties of achieving 
complete comprehensiveness and the traditionally “piecemeal” approach 
that legislators often take to solve problems.145 
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When an underinclusive statute has a discriminatory motive, how-
ever, it should not be upheld.  In our situation, the animus towards gend-
er non-conforming people is clear.  This is an impermissible motivation.  
As Tussman and tenBroek point out, 
when a classification is under-inclusive, the Court must satisfy itself 
that there is no fair reason for the law which would not require with 
equal force its extension to those whom it leaves untouched.  It is 
relevant to inquire, in this connection, whether the failure to extend 
the law to others similarly situated is due to the presence of forbid-
den legislative motive.146 
If police confusion is such a problem, why is gender the only category 
that these laws address? 
The laws, however, are also overbroad in that they are directed at a 
group that does not meet the legislative purpose at all.  It is a fallacy to 
include among the maliciously-disguised those people for whom their 
gender expression is not a disguise at all, but how they live their daily 
life and understand their deepest sense of self.  It is “perfectly unreason-
able” in the professors’ view to pass a law where “no member of the 
class defined in the law is tainted with the mischief at which the law 
aims.”147  It is no more a disguise for a transgender person to dress in 
accordance with his or her gender identity than it is for a near-sighted 
person to wear glasses or a person with big feet to wear large shoes. 
Even granting, for argument’s sake, that transgender people are in 
“disguise,” which itself betrays a deep ignorance of transgender people’s 
lives and experiences, the laws are still impermissibly overinclusive be-
cause there is no significant risk of crime.148  “Even in San Francisco (the 
U.S. city most likely to have the highest percentage of transgender wom-
en per capita), there has never been a single police report of a transgend-
er woman harassing another woman in a bathroom.”149  In Tussman and 
tenBroek’s view, overinclusive legislation of the sort that sweeps up 
huge numbers of innocents among the guilty is only appropriate in an 
emergency context, such as a war or disease outbreak, or when the “im-
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positions are relatively mild,” such as with a road block.150  As we dis-
cussed above, this imposition is far from mild on transgender people, 
often leading to health problems, grievous harassment, and employment 
discrimination.  And no advocate of bathroom discrimination has ever 
presented one iota of evidence that transgender people pose more of a 
“danger” than any other group. 
In addition, an argument used in a cross-dressing case that applies 
equally to the bathroom context is that there are laws on the books to 
punish any of the feared crimes a person could commit in the bathroom.  
“Particularly apparent is the fact that absent this ordinance the conduct of 
a [transgender person] remains subject to statutes or ordinances prohibit-
ing soliciting, importuning, pandering obscenity, public indecency, tres-
passing, or soliciting rides or hitchhiking.”151  The denial of bathroom 
access is not only offensive and unfair, but also unjustifiable. 
In the one cross-dressing case that does deal with an act of crimi-
nality, the defendant argued that she had a female gender identity, and 
thus, the law punishing disguises did not apply.  In that case, two geneti-
cally male defendants dressed as women in order to convince a man that 
they were female prostitutes and that he should let them in the car.152  
Once in the car, they robbed him.  The defendant appealed the court’s 
application of a law that provided for enhanced penalties for “wearing a 
hood, mask, or other device that concealed his identity” while commit-
ting the crime.153  The defendant argued against application of the en-
hancement because the defendant was, in fact, female-identified.  The 
defendant pointed to “evidence at trial that the police knew him as a man 
who dresses as a woman . . . [and] contend[ed] his true identity is that of 
a woman.”154 
The court upheld the trial court’s application of the law because, in 
their eyes, the defendant had offered insufficient evidence to show that 
this was not a disguise and because, unlike cases holding cross-dressing 
prohibitions unconstitutional, this was a prohibition “associated with 
criminal conduct and . . . public health, safety, morals and welfare.”155  
The dissent argued that “[t]he days when a person’s gender can be readi-
ly ascertained by the attire worn have passed,” and that the language of 
the statute indicated an intent to prohibit “conceal[ing]” and not “dis-
guis[ing] or alter[ing]” appearance.156  Of course, there is no dispute that 
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if the defendant had been found to be wearing women’s clothes because 
the defendant identified as female, the applicable robbery or theft statute 
would have remained to convict the defendant of the crimes alleged.  In 
Tussman and tenBroek’s analysis, the prohibition on gender-based “dis-
guises” would likely fail because of the overwhelming likelihood, borne 
out by the evidence, that it would be used to target transgender people 
exclusively. 
A court applied reasoning similar to that used by Tussman and ten-
Broek in a recent Arizona case.  The court in Kastl v. Maricopa County 
Community College District addressed the equal protection problems 
raised by denying transgender people access to appropriate bathrooms 
and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss a transgender plaintiff’s 
§ 1983 claim based on bathroom discrimination.157  This case is distin-
guishable from many that we have discussed because the plaintiff ar-
gued, using medical proof, that she was indeed genotypically female 
even though she possessed male genitals.158  Nevertheless, the court’s 
reasoning for finding the defendant’s policies unconstitutional applies to 
all transgender people. 
Although the Court agrees that Defendant possesses a legitimate in-
terest in protecting the privacy and safety of its patrons . . . the 
Court fails to see, and Defendant fails to indicate, how the imple-
mentation of that policy in a manner which singles out nonconform-
ing individuals, including transsexuals, for a greater intrusion upon 
their privacy is rationally related to such an interest.159 
The court continued, “Though government action may be upheld if 
its connection to a legitimate interest is tenuous or the action is unwise, 
where ‘the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of 
the legislature, its impartiality would be suspect.’”160 
The plaintiff highlighted the discriminatory nature of the defen-
dant’s bathroom policy requiring proof of male genitals to use the men’s 
room.  First, only she and another transgender person were required to 
provide this proof.  Second, the defendant refused to acknowledge her 
state-issued identification (that had a female gender marker).  The court 
was unsympathetic to the defendant. 
Contrary to Defendant’s suggestion that the justification for the pol-
icy is “readily apparent,” the only justification of which the Court 
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can conceive is one predicated on one or more of the following 
baseless assumptions: 1) transsexuals pose a greater risk to minors’ 
and others’ safety than any other group; 2) a biological woman can 
never have lived or presented herself as a man; and 3) the presence 
of a biological woman with male genitalia invades the privacy 
and/or threatens the safety of other women.161 
The court rejected all of these rationales and held the defendant’s policy 
to be unconstitutional. 
Besides being justified by this reasoning, Tussman and tenBroek’s 
analysis has garnered support in the cross-dressing cases, and even—in 
the case of Kastl—a bathroom case.  This well-established framework 
aptly defeats the criminal and fraud concerns surrounding barring trans-
gender people from appropriate bathrooms. 
B.  Discouraging Homosexuality: An Unconstitutional Purpose 
The opposition to overt homosexuality in cross-dressing cases also 
echoes contemporary objections.  In both contexts, these arguments lack 
a legal basis.  The privacy objection to transgender-inclusive laws is 
rooted in the idea that restricting restroom use to persons of the same sex 
guarantees privacy from the sexual (or otherwise “improper”) gaze of 
others.  In other words, the presumption that a woman’s privacy is guar-
anteed by excluding men from a particular space rests on the presump-
tion that only men would be interested in intruding on that privacy.  The 
presumption says both too much and too little in presuming all men 
would violate a woman’s privacy and that no women would.  Neither is, 
of course, true.  It also ignores the analytical divide that exists between 
gender identity and sexual orientation.  Many transgender people are also 
gay, lesbian, or bisexual.  Similar to the bathroom cases, the subtext of 
the cross-dressing cases is that transgender people are predators not to be 
trusted, especially in a bathroom setting involving nudity and private 
acts. 
Of course, the same arguments have long motivated laws discrimi-
nating against gay and lesbian people.  In 1978, State Senator John 
Briggs pushed for a ballot initiative that would have fired all gay and 
lesbian schoolteachers in California.  At one event supporting the meas-
ure, Briggs argued that “[h]omosexuals want your children . . . .  They 
don’t have any children of their own . . . .  That’s why they want to be 
teachers and be equal status and have those people serve as role models 
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and encourage to join them.”162  The same vaguely predatory notions 
animated the Boy Scouts’ argument for excluding homosexuals in the 
infamous Boy Scouts of America v. Dale case.  In that case, Boy Scouts 
argued that gay people are inappropriate for leadership positions that in-
volve “many overnight camping trips . . . a week together in summer 
camp, [and] . . . a far greater degree of intimacy among members than 
would be the case in a group that met only for formal meet-
ings . . . .”  The court continued, “When an 11 year-old boy away from 
home for the first time becomes afraid at night, skins his knee, or forgets 
his sleeping bag, he looks to his Scoutmaster for support.”163 
The ongoing debate over Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) also cen-
ters on fears of the predatory homosexual.  In 2008, at the first hearing 
on DADT since its passage, Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center for 
Military Readiness, warned of “transgenders in the military,” “forcible 
sodomy,” and spreading “HIV positivity” through the ranks.164  Senator 
Saxby Chambliss of Georgia commented at a Senate Armed Services 
Committee hearing in 2010 that repealing Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell would 
lead to “alcohol use, adultery, fraternization, and body art.”165 
While Dale and Don’t Ask Don’t Tell remain the law of the land, 
the anti-gay sentiment at the heart of both cannot be questioned.  Just as 
DADT is rejected by much of the country,166 the view of transgender 
people as predators is similarly doomed to fade away. 
C.  Maintaining Traditional Gender Norms 
In both the cross-dressing and bathroom contexts, the social norms-
based argument that anatomy is determinative of a person’s sex and, 
therefore, should dictate which restroom a person uses remains strong.  
Analysis of the cross-dressing cases reveals that fear of changing social 
norms was at the heart of the enforcement of such laws even while courts 
and society were acknowledging their diminishing legitimacy.  Overall, 
the justifications closely mirror the safety and privacy objections raised 
in opposition to gender identity nondiscrimination laws protecting bath-
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room access.  The diminishment of societal fears associated with the en-
forcement of cross-dressing laws presages the diminishment of related 
fears associated with objections to modern laws that would protect trans-
gender people.  As Professor William Eskridge points out, ultimately, 
“laws against cross-dressing were undermined by cultural acceptance of 
women’s freedom to wear comfortable men’s clothing.”167  Similarly, as 
the hysteria around transgender people’s existence subsides, restrictive 
and discriminatory bathroom policies will go the way of the cross-
dressing laws. 
Many of the courts that sided with the defendants in cross-dressing 
cases did so because of an understanding of these changing gender roles 
and the corresponding declining importance of maintaining them.  Just as 
bathroom cases described the presence of transgender people in bath-
rooms as “disconcerting”—as if people had a legal right to impose their 
social norms on others in order to be free from psychic disturbance—in 
City of Chicago v. Wilson, the court correctly identified the city’s argu-
ment that cross-dressing by transgender people offended the public’s 
“aesthetic preferences” as merely a justification for a prohibitive city 
ordinance.  The court held 
the city has not articulated the manner in which the ordinance is de-
signed to protect the public morals. It is presumably believed that 
cross-dressing in public is offensive to the general public’s aesthetic 
preference. There is no evidence, however, that cross-dressing, 
when done as a part of a preoperative therapy program or otherwise, 
is, in and of itself, harmful to society. In this case, the aesthetic pre-
ference of society must be balanced against the individual’s well-
being.168 
The court’s ultimate balancing in Wilson is precisely what is needed 
in the bathroom cases.  When the well-being of someone in nondiscrimi-
natory and safe access to a bathroom is balanced against society’s so-
called comfort, founded in fear and misunderstanding of those with less 
traditional gender presentation, the reasoning of Wilson urges valuing the 
humanity of a marginalized person over the aesthetic preference of socie-
ty at large.  This is especially true given: (1) the impermanence of social 
norms of appearance, particularly gender-based ones; and (2) the ephe-
meral nature of the gendered biological assumptions behind the norms.  
The impermanence of social norms is obvious when viewed through a 
historical lens.  Although seeing women in pants would have been dis-
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concerting and offensive to many people 100 years ago, today it is ordi-
nary, commonplace, and likely offensive only to a very small number of 
people. 
Despite what seems like an obvious choice in valuing humanity 
over fleeting aesthetic comfort, at the root of the opposition to transgend-
er bathroom equality lies the idea that sex-segregated bathrooms are 
meant for different groups of people based on their real or perceived 
physiological differences.  This idea, that a real or perceived “genital 
test” motivates the bathroom debate, is simply untrue, as demonstrated in 
the informal policing of bathrooms. 
According to a survey conducted by the Transgender Law Center, 
butch women or femme men who attempt to use a bathroom are fre-
quently subjected to the same types of harassment and discrimination as 
transgender people.169  It is common for many women who appear ste-
reotypically masculine or insufficiently stereotypically feminine (wheth-
er a transgender or non-transgender woman), to be confronted by women 
and asked to confirm their anatomical or biological female identity.170  
That request for confirmation is simply for a verbal affirmation that the 
person is female, an affirmation that would impliedly confirm that the 
person perceived to be male has female genitals.  For example, it is the 
experience of the author of this Article with the traditionally female 
name that when confronted in a bathroom by someone who presumes her 
to be male based on her gender presentation, a simple, “I am not in the 
wrong bathroom,” successfully diffuses the stated opposition to her pres-
ence. 
If such affirmation is made, then the objection to the masculine-
appearing woman’s use of the facilities is withdrawn.  No change of ap-
pearance needs to take place; nor would the person confronted actually 
have to verbally, much less visually, confirm having female genitals.  It 
is hard in the extreme to understand or articulate how the confirmation of 
the presence or absence of female genitals provides any real information 
whatsoever about the so-called offensive individual and why the non-
verbal, non-explicit confirmation does enough to assuage any raised con-
cerns. 
In the formal context of the cross-dressing cases, these two prin-
ciples of changing social norms and even the ephemeral nature of gen-
dered biological assumptions root the courts’ vagueness analysis.  In one 
case, the court held that “[t]he defect is that the terms of the ordinance, 
‘dress not belonging to his or her sex,’ when considered in the light of 
                                                        
 169. S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, GENDER NEUTRAL BATHROOM SURVEY (2001), 
http://transgenderlawcenter.org/pdf/sbac_survey.pdf. 
 170. Id. 
2010] Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom Equality 167 
contemporary dress habits, make it ‘so vague that men of common intel-
ligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion.’”171  Other courts rejected similar ordinances for the same reason.172  
Courts also emphasized the risk of arbitrary enforcement posed by such a 
vague law.  One court held that “[s]uch boundless discretion granted by 
the ordinance encourages arbitrary and capricious enforcement of the 
law.  It provides a convenient instrument for harsh and discriminatory 
enforcement by prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed 
to merit their displeasure.”173 
Similarly, in the formal context as it plays out in bathrooms, prohi-
bitions preventing transgender people from using a gender-concordant 
restroom are based on a standard that is impermissibly vague.  Police 
officers may purport to use a “know it when I see it” approach to gender, 
but that is often as arbitrary as the cross-dressing laws.  The genital test 
or, more accurately, the perceived-genital test that police claim to use is 
just as arbitrarily and inconsistently enforced.  Police and employers (as 
in the Goins case) even ignore a state’s vital records laws that grant legal 
status to change of gender. 
In practice, legal authorities frequently do not rely on a genital 
test—much less a chromosome test—to determine who is a man or a 
woman.  This was clearly demonstrated in a 2009 federal civil rights case 
brought by a female prisoner with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia.174  
Though chromosomally female, the plaintiff’s condition led to “a hor-
monal imbalance which typically results in females assuming certain 
male characteristics,” including “ambiguous external genitalia” and fa-
cial hair.175  Despite pleading with officials to place her in the women’s 
ward and presenting a doctor’s note that she was indeed chromosomally 
female, the prison placed her in the “alternative lifestyle ward” among 
gay men and male-to-female transgender people.  During the day, this 
ward mixed freely with the men’s ward.  In addition, the plaintiff was 
repeatedly strip-searched by male prison guards against her wishes that a 
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female guard perform the searches.176  Despite all of this, the court 
granted the prison’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the 
plaintiff had failed to show that defendants should have known she was 
female and “crucially, plaintiff admitted that she did not appear to be 
female.”177  Even when authorities purport to be following a physiologi-
cal rule to determine someone’s gender, genotype is not what they ac-
tually use. 
The bathroom and cross-dressing jurisprudence highlights the com-
plicated nature of gender and sex and why transgender people must be 
accorded the same respect as non-transgender people in making that de-
termination.  In Kastl v. Maricopa Community College, the court rejected 
the defendant’s argument for a genital test to determine bathroom access.  
In that case, as discussed above, the plaintiff argued that though she pos-
sessed male genitals, she was a “biological female.”178  The court pointed 
out, “plaintiff has stated that she is a biological woman.  She lives and 
presents herself as a woman, and offered her state-issued driver’s license 
to the defendant as proof of her biological sex . . . .”179  Yet, this wasn’t 
enough for the defendant, who required “proof” of the plaintiff’s genit-
als.  In holding for the plaintiff, the court reasoned that “were this infor-
mation truly necessary to preserve the single-sex nature of the defen-
dant’s restrooms and the safety and privacy of their users, surely it would 
be sought from each person prior to granting restroom access,” not just 
transsexual employees.180  While the defendant argued that it had “a 
compelling interest in enforcing sex-segregated use of its restrooms in 
order to preserve the safety and privacy of all users,” the court rejected 
the idea that it was constitutionally permissible to demand information 
about the plaintiff’s genitalia to carry out that mission.181 
The court further rejected the genital test, reasoning that 
genitalia is not the sole indicator of sex.  While information con-
cerning an individual’s genitalia may assist Defendant in assigning 
that person to the restroom of a particular sex, reliance on that in-
formation to the exclusion of other offers of proof might lead to in-
accurate determinations of sex.  Obtaining information about Plain-
tiff’s genitalia when her sex has otherwise been established there-
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fore cannot be said to be narrowly tailored to the Defendant’s inter-
est in determining sex for restroom use purposes.182 
In addition, for the cross-dressing cases, courts accepted a Gender 
Identity Disorder diagnosis to be sufficient to warrant gender-appropriate 
clothing and bathroom usage even when the individuals had not under-
gone genital surgery.  In Doe v. McConn, for instance, the court made it 
quite clear that the plaintiffs were “fully diagnosed transsexuals who, as 
of the commencement of this cause of action, had not undergone sexual 
reassignment surgery.”183  In the words of a contemporary account, the 
ruling held that the law was unconstitutional because “cross-dressing was 
an important part of therapy for people undergoing sex change.”184  It is 
important to note as well that, as the dissent in City of Chicago v. Wilson 
points out, the majority opinion in that case took for granted the trans-
gender parties’ participation in a psychiatric and medical treatment pro-
gram. 
The only testimony in support of the defendants’ claim was that of 
the defendants themselves.  No psychiatrist was called to testify that 
the defendants had been diagnosed as transsexuals or that cross-
dressing had been prescribed as preoperative therapy.  No letter or 
statement was offered in evidence. Neither defendant named the 
psychiatrist from whom he was receiving treatment.  Indeed, the de-
fendant Wilson, on cross-examination, testified that he didn’t know 
what sex-reassignment surgery would involve and said he did not 
know the doctor who would perform it.185 
Also, as pointed out in the cross-dressing cases, the vital records 
laws of most states permit a change of legal gender status.186  Forty-
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seven states permit transgender people to modify their birth certificates 
and other official documents to reflect change of gender, including those 
with transgender-inclusive nondiscrimination laws that have penalized 
transgender people for using the appropriate bathroom.  To then bar 
those people from using the right bathroom places them in the untenable 
position of having no bathroom to use. 
In City of Chicago v. Wilson, the court noted that it made little 
sense for the state to recognize sex reassignment surgery in its vital 
records laws but then punish those dressing in accordance with their 
gender identity.  The court reasoned that since the vital records law 
authorizes the issuance of a new certificate of birth following sex-
reassignment surgery, the legislature has implicitly recognized the 
necessity and validity of such surgery. It would be inconsistent to 
permit sex-reassignment surgery yet, at the same time, impede the 
necessary therapy in preparation for such surgery. Individuals con-
templating such surgery should, in consultation with their doctors, 
be entitled to pursue the therapy necessary to insure the correctness 
of their decision.187 
Similarly, in a 2005 immigration case, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals held that “The Defense of Marriage Act does not preclude, for 
purposes of Federal law, recognition of a marriage involving a post-
operative transsexual, where the marriage is considered by the State in 
which it was performed as one between two individuals of the opposite 
sex.”188 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The past twenty years have witnessed a revolution in transgender 
equality.  More states are passing transgender-inclusive nondiscrimina-
tion laws, more corporations are enacting protections for gender identity 
and expression, and more Americans are taking up the fight for the 
equality of their transgender neighbors and friends.  Yet, if transgender 
people cannot access appropriate bathrooms, then they truly cannot par-
ticipate fully in our society. 
In the cross-dressing cases and the bathroom cases, the same faulty 
arguments are offered to support bathroom discrimination: (1) that these 
laws are necessary to prevent crime; (2) that they are a safeguard against 
fraud; (3) that society’s gender norms should be protected; and (4) that 
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they are a way to discourage homosexuality.  The courts of the 1970s 
struck down the cross-dressing laws and rejected these arguments as un-
constitutional.  We have made the case in this Article that courts must 
recognize that these legally infirm arguments are no more proper in the 
bathroom context. 
